O. Ivan WHITE; et al., Defendants-Appellees, v. Rhonda Fleming, Proposed Intervenor, Movant-Appellant.
Decided: July 23, 2020
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Michael William Bien, Esquire, Attorney, Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Geri Lynn Green, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Green & Green LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Robin Lucas, Valerie Mercadel, Raquel Douthit John H. Hemann, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees O. Ivan White, Loy Hayes, Dennis Smith, Sheila Yarborough, Wayne Ernst John H. Hemann, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, CA, Savith Iyengar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee United States of America Rhonda Fleming, Pro Se
Federal prisoner Rhonda Fleming appeals pro se from the district court's order denying her motion to intervene and to enforce the settlement agreement in Lucas v. White, 96-cv-02905 (N.D. Cal.). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court properly denied Fleming's motion because it had previously dismissed the action with prejudice and did not expressly retain jurisdiction or incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement in its order. See Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016) (“If a district court wishes to retain jurisdiction to later enforce the terms of a settlement agreement, the order dismissing a case with prejudice must incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement or expressly retain jurisdiction.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fleming's motion for default. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that the district court may deny a motion for default where the claims of the party seeking default lack merit).
We reject as without merit Fleming's contention that the district court denied her due process.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
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