WALLACE v. ROGER HICKEL CONTRACTING INC (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

David Wallace appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his action alleging disability discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations. O'Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Wallace's action because Wallace filed this action after the applicable statute of limitations had run and failed to show extraordinary circumstances beyond his control that justified equitable tolling. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Americans with Disabilities Act, borrowing from Title VII, provides for a ninety-day period to sue after receiving a right-to-sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); O'Donnell, 466 F.3d at 1111 (“[W]here a complaint is timely filed and later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not toll or suspend the 90-day limitations period.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that equitable tolling is warranted “when extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim on time”).

We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court's orders denying Wallace's post-judgment motions because Wallace failed to file an amended or separate notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017).

We do not consider allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending requests made by Wallace in his opening brief are denied.

AFFIRMED.