GOODRICK v. Idaho Department of Correction; Idaho Board of Corrections, Defendants. (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

Idaho state prisoner Dan Goodrick appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment and dismissal order in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (decision on cross-motions for summary judgment); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly denied Goodrick’s cross-motion for summary judgment and properly dismissed Goodrick’s due process claim because Goodrick failed to demonstrate that the version of Idaho Code § 20-223(9) in effect from July 1, 2014 to July 1, 2017 provided a protected liberty interest in pre-parole programming. See Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) (a state-created right can beget other rights to essential procedures; the underlying right must have come into existence before it can trigger due process protection); Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 975 P.2d 1181, 1186 (1999) (explaining that under § 20-223, “there is no constitutionally protected interest in parole in Idaho”); see also Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208, 95 S.Ct. 1605, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975) (“[A] State’s highest court is the final judicial arbiter of the meaning of state statutes․”).

We reject as without merit Goodrick’s contentions that the district court advocated on behalf of defendants or erred by addressing § 20-223 as a whole rather than § 20-223(9).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Goodrick’s request for the names of the panel members (Docket Entry No. 8) is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.