EVANSON v. SAUL (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

Gary Evanson appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. Reviewing de novo, we may set aside a denial of benefits only if the decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

1. Evanson contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consider Evanson’s combined impairments and subjective symptoms. However, the medical record evidence indicated minimal to no objective symptoms or limitations due to Evanson’s impairments, and the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting Evanson’s subjective reports about his limitations due to pain and fatigue. See id. at 1112; Carmickle v. Comm’r, SSA, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). The existence of Evanson’s impairments alone is insufficient to establish functional limitations or disability. See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ did not err in failing properly to address mental impairments. Evanson never asserted at the administrative level that he was disabled due to any mental condition, and the medical record evidence does not support such an assertion.

2. Evanson contends that the ALJ erred in determining that Evanson had the residual functional capacity to perform medium level work and could perform his past relevant work as a carpenter. However, as discussed above, the medical record evidence indicated minimal objective symptoms or limitations due to Evanson’s impairments, and the ALJ properly discounted Evanson’s reports regarding the extent of his subjective symptoms and limitations. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of Evanson’s residual functional capacity. Furthermore, the ALJ’s finding that Evanson performed past relevant work as a carpenter at the medium work exertion level is supported by substantial evidence in the record, including Evanson’s own descriptions of his work history accompanying his application for benefits. The ALJ was not required to consult a vocational expert in making the determination that Evanson could perform past relevant work. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Evanson could perform past relevant work as a carpenter at the medium work exertion level.

3. Evanson contends the ALJ erred by failing to apply the presumptive disability standards at 20 C.F.R § 404.1562. These standards were inapplicable given Evanson’s education level and past relevant work experience.

AFFIRMED.