DAVIS v. GOODYEAR POLICE DEPARTMENT (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

Arizona state pretrial detainee John Leo Davis appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of his arrest in 2015. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Davis’s action as time-barred because Davis filed this action more than two years after his federal claims accrued, and more than one year after his state law claims accrued. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821 (one-year statute of limitations for actions against a public entity or public employee); Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2018) (state tolling and statute of limitations for personal injury claims apply to § 1983 action, and federal law governs when claim accrues, which is when a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that forms the basis for his cause of action); see also Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, 955 P.2d 951, 964 (1998) (unsound mind equitable tolling may not be established by “conclusory averments such as assertions that one was unable to manage daily affairs or understand legal rights and liabilities” but rather requires plaintiff to set forth “specific facts”).

AFFIRMED.