UNITED STATES v. GUTIERREZ DIAZ (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

Brayan Gutierrez-Diaz appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress post-arrest statements. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. We review de novo the adequacy of a Miranda warning. See United States v. Loucious, 847 F.3d 1146, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2017). In reviewing the sufficiency of a Miranda instruction, “courts are not required to examine the words employed as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement,” but rather “simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights.” Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010) (citation omitted). Miranda does not mandate a “precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.” California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981).

Gutierrez-Diaz argues that the Spanish translation of the Miranda warning he received was deficient because of the claimed inherent ambiguity of the Spanish pronoun “le,” which can mean either “him/her” or “you.” He maintains that he understood the warning (which was both read to him and presented to him in writing) to mean that an attorney could be appointed before Gutierrez-Diaz asked that attorney questions (rather than that he would be appointed an attorney before government agents asked him questions). Gutierrez-Diaz thus claims that the warning failed to adequately inform him that he had the right to have an attorney appointed prior to interrogation.

Even assuming Gutierrez-Diaz offers a correct translation — which the government disputes — the Miranda warning that he received was adequate. Under his proffered version, Gutierrez-Diaz was informed of his rights to: (i) “consult an attorney”; (ii) “have an attorney present during the interrogation”; and (iii) “appointed” counsel if he was “unable to pay for the services of an attorney.”

Collectively, these statements provided Gutierrez-Diaz with sufficient notice of his right to appointed counsel prior to interrogation. See Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356-61, 101 S.Ct. 2806 (unnecessary to explicitly state when an attorney could be appointed, if the Miranda warning conveys a general right to counsel before and during an interrogation). Indeed, this court rejected a similar challenge in People of Territory of Guam v. Snaer, 758 F.2d 1341, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1985) (right to counsel before interrogation is inferred when a Miranda instruction conveys both a general “right to consult with a lawyer” and the more specific right to “have a lawyer present with you while you are being questioned”). In addition, contextual clues such as the waiver of rights section — which Gutierrez-Diaz signed — make clear that the Miranda instruction, including the attorney appointment clause, pertains to Gutierrez-Diaz’s rights in connection with being questioned.

2. We review a district court’s ruling on whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000). Gutierrez-Diaz seeks an evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose to determine which party’s translation of the Miranda warning is correct. Because we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Miranda warning sufficed even under Gutierrez-Diaz’s translation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

AFFIRMED.