FULFORD v. John Cranshaw; Denies Reyes, Defendants. (2020)
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Fred FULFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Don M. GRIFFITH, D.P.M., Defendant-Appellee, John Cranshaw; Denies Reyes, Defendants.
Decided: February 07, 2020
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Fred Fulford, Pro Se Kevin Kelly, The Goldman Law Firm, Tiburon, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
California state prisoner Fred Fulford appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Fulford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Griffith was deliberately indifferent to Fulford’s foot condition. See id. at 1057-60 (deliberate indifference is a “high legal standard” requiring a defendant be aware of and disregard an excessive risk to an inmate’s health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Griffith’s motion for reconsideration, because the district court considered the wrong reply brief when it initially ruled on Griffith’s motion for summary judgment. See N.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7-9(b) (setting forth grounds for reconsideration); see also Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review for compliance with local rules).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Griffith to file successive summary judgment motions. See Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and describing trial court’s discretion to permit successive motions for summary judgment).
We reject as unsupported by the record Fulford’s contentions that the district judge was biased or that Fulford was purposefully misled as to which reply defendant Griffith meant for the district court to consider.
We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal, or not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
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