SPENCE v. SANTORO (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Gerald Spence appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his safety and serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Spence’s action because Spence failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (setting forth elements of a failure-to-protect claim); Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]here is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.”); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements of a medical deliberate indifference claim).

We reject as meritless Spence’s contention that the district court applied a “different” pleading standard to his claims.

Spence’s “Request for Certificate of Appealability” is denied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.