SNYDER v. STEVENS (2019)

MEMORANDUM ***

James F. Snyder appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm and remand with instructions.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant because success on Snyder’s § 1983 claim for monetary damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his [prior] conviction” for disorderly conduct and is therefore barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) (claims relying on an alleged Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), violation are “outside the province of § 1983” under Heck); Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1192 n.12 (9th Cir. 2015) (Heck bars convictions that were not directly appealed, even where habeas was “effectively unavailable”). In light of the fact that Snyder’s suit is barred by Heck, it was unnecessary for the district court to reach the merits.

Dismissal should be without prejudice, however, so that Snyder can “reassert his claims if he ever succeeds in invalidating his conviction.” Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). We therefore remand with instructions that the district court enter judgment without prejudice.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED with instructions.