UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Quinton Williams appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking supervised release and imposing a new 24-month term of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Williams contends that the government failed to prove that he violated the conditions of his supervised release. The evidence presented at the contested revocation hearing, including witness testimony and a state judgment of conviction, was sufficient to support the district court’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Williams violated supervised release by committing a state crime. See United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (“On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a supervised release revocation, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Carrion, 457 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1972) (conviction can be evidence of supervised release violation even if it is being appealed).

Williams also contends that his 24-month supervised release term is substantively unreasonable in light of his impaired mental functions. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The term of supervised release is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors, particularly the need to protect the public. See id. Moreover, the record reflects that the district court considered only proper sentencing factors. See United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.