ABELAR PEREZ v. BARR (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Abelar-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.

We review de novo questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006).

The BIA did not err in finding that two of Abelar-Perez’s proposed social groups—bus assistants who refuse to pay taxes to gang members and long-term residents of the United States who return to El Salvador—are not cognizable. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’ ” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))); see also Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005) (business owners in Colombia who rejected demands by narco-traffickers to participate in illegal activity was too broad a category to qualify as a particular social group); Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1138-40 (9th Cir. 2016) (“deportees from the United States to El Salvador” are not a particular social group).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Abelar-Perez failed to establish he would be persecuted on account of any other protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Our conclusion is not affected by the differing nexus standards applicable to asylum and withholding of removal claims. Cf. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing Zetino v. Holder having drawn no distinction between the standards where there was no nexus at all to a protected ground). Thus, the withholding claim fails.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because Abelar-Perez failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (possibility of torture too speculative); Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033-35 (9th Cir. 2014) (petitioner did not establish the necessary “state action” for CAT relief). Thus, the claim for CAT relief fails.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.