UNITED STATES v. MCGOWAN (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Pamela McGowan appeals the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. McGowan concedes that her claim under Dean v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017), was not filed within one year of when her conviction became final, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). She argues, however, that her motion is timely under § 2255(f)(3) because Dean applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. We expressly rejected that argument in Garcia v. United States, 923 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2019). We therefore deny McGowan’s Dean claim as time-barred.

2. McGowan also argues that her prior conviction for armed bank robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). That argument fails, however, because we have held that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. See United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Davis, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), which held that § 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, does not affect our decision in Watson. See Watson, 881 F.3d at 784 (“We need not address the residual clause because we conclude that the relevant offense of armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause.”). McGowan contends that Watson was wrongly decided, but because a three-judge panel of this court is generally bound by existing Ninth Circuit precedent subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, see Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003), we must abide by the decision.

AFFIRMED.