JOHNSON v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (2019)

MEMORANDUM ***

Deborah A. Johnson challenges the district court's refusal to order the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) as the administrator of General Electric Company's (“GE”) disability-insurance plan (the “Plan”) to pay her additional long-term disability benefits. The facts are known to the parties, so we do not repeat them here.

First, Johnson claims that MetLife miscalculated the benefits owed to her under the Plan. We disagree. The Plan bases Johnson's benefits on her “normal-straight time annual earnings” (“NSTAE”). Under the Plan's terms, Johnson's NSTAE includes the amount she was “earning as salary,” unless GE's Pension Board “provide[s]” that it also includes “commissions,” “other variable compensation,” or “special or supplemental payments.” MetLife calculated Johnson's disability benefits based on an annual salary of $ 219,300, and Johnson's payroll records corroborate that her salary was in fact $ 219,300. Johnson offers no evidence that the Pension Board determined that her NSTAE should include other compensation. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that Johnson failed to prove her claim for benefits.

Second, Johnson argues that the district court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence—specifically, the declarations of GE and MetLife employees. We disagree. Such extrinsic evidence was “necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision,” Opeta v. Nw. Airlines Pension Plan for Contract Emps., 484 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted), because it rebuts Johnson's claim that her salary was $ 350,446 per year instead of $ 219,300. Without such evidence, the administrative record reflects only competing assertions from the parties about Johnson's earnings in the year before her disability. Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting such evidence.

Finally, Johnson argues that GE and MetLife failed to comply with certain procedural requirements in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. We need not reach these arguments, however, because they cannot affect this case's outcome. Johnson's sole cause of action is 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which authorizes her “to recover benefits,” “to enforce [her] rights,” or “to clarify [her] rights to future benefits” under the Plan's terms. See also CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 435–38, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011). Here, the district court conducted a de novo review of MetLife's calculations and concluded that Johnson's benefits were correctly determined. We agree, and therefore Johnson is not entitled to any further relief.

AFFIRMED.