IN RE: Carlos E. PORRAS (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Carlos E. Porras appeals pro se from the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of his second motion for sanctions for violation of the automatic stay. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the district court's decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standards of review applied by the district court. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). We may affirm the bankruptcy court's decision on any ground fairly supported by the record. In re Warren, 568 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

Denial of Porras's second motion for sanctions for violation of the automatic stay was not an abuse of discretion because Porras failed to demonstrate that such relief was warranted. See In re Miller, 397 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The automatic stay does not apply to proceedings initiated against the debtor if the proceedings are initiated in the same bankruptcy court where the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings are pending.”); In re Teerlink Ranch Ltd, 886 F.2d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The stay does not operate against the court with jurisdiction over the bankrupt.”); see also Miller v. Cardinale (In re DeVille), 361 F.3d 539, 547 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review).

Contrary to Porras's contention, the conversion of his bankruptcy case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 did not create a new automatic stay. See In re Ramirez, 188 B.R. 413, 416 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (“The great weight of authority holds that the automatic stay provisions of § 362 are not triggered by conversion.”).

Porras's request to strike portions of the excerpts of record, set forth in the reply brief, is denied.

Appellees’ request for costs and fees, set forth in their answering brief, is denied without prejudice.

AFFIRMED.