JOHNSON v. PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES LLC (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Ardreda Johnson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and state law claims arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s FDCPA claims against PennyMac Mortgage Opportunity Fund Investors, LLC and Crosby Capital USA, LLC because Johnson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants were “debt collectors.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from definition of “debt collector” a creditor collecting debts on its own behalf); Afewerki v. Anaya Law Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 774 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under the FDCPA, a creditor collecting debts on its own behalf is not a ‘debt collector.’ ”).

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) because Johnson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants sought to foreclose on behalf of an entity that did not have the present right to possession of the property through an enforceable security interest. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ).

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s FDCPA claims under §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692j, and 1692i because Johnson failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692i and 1692j; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Contrary to Johnson’s contention, the district court did not rule on defendants’ request for judicial notice, and in any case, it would have not abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of state court records. See United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (standard of review); U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a court “may take [judicial] notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue” (citation omitted) ).

Defendants’ joint motion for summary affirmance (Docket Entry No. 7) is denied.

AFFIRMED.