NOYOLA v. HAMMOND (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Washington state prisoner Mario Noyola appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Noyola’s Eighth Amendment claim on the basis of qualified immunity because defendants’ conduct did not violate clearly established law. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (defendants sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated a right that was clearly established; “a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Noyola’s motion to alter or amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because Noyola failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Rule 59(e) ). Contrary to Noyola’s contention, the district court considered the proper factors and adequately articulated its reasoning.

AFFIRMED.