CAMACHO CORONA v. ORTIZ (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Pedro Camacho-Corona appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1997). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Camacho-Corona’s claim against defendant Blier because Camacho-Corona failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any delay in treatment for his surgery wound evinces in deliberate indifference. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (a delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference to a serious medical need only if the delay caused significant harm).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Camacho-Corona’s claim against defendant Castillo on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to every reasonable official that denying Camacho-Corona access to a wheelchair was unlawful under the circumstances. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (explaining two-part test for qualified immunity).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.