KELLEY v. PETERS (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Michael D. Kelley, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations in connection with his confinement in administrative segregation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants because Kelley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants provided insufficient notice of the reasons for retaining him in administrative segregation, or as to whether the “some evidence” standard was met. See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 – 88 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that due process claims based on administrative segregation are subject to the “some evidence” standard); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing “indicia of reliability” of evidence); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 – 1101 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (describing due process notice and hearing requirements in the administrative segregation context).

AFFIRMED.