EDWARDS v. MILLER (2018)

MEMORANDUM ***

Petitioner Samuel Edwards, a state prisoner, was convicted on four counts of armed robbery in San Diego County Superior Court on June 14, 2010. Edwards filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, which was dismissed on June 2, 2016. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on claims one and two. These claims allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel and a violation of due process rights by improper admission of DNA evidence. Edwards appeals on the certified issues. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253(a), and we affirm.

1. We review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus de novo. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 964 (9th Cir. 2004). The state argues that review of Edwards’s claims are foreclosed by the procedural bar doctrine. We need not address the issue because we find that resolution on the merits provides a more straightforward basis to decide the appeal. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002). For essentially similar reasons, we also review the merits of Edwards’s claims de novo. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010).

2. In his first certified claim, Edwards contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not retain a DNA expert to challenge the state’s DNA evidence, which Edwards asserts was cross-contaminated. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Edwards must show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and also that he suffered prejudice as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–89, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Even assuming Edwards could show counsel performed deficiently, Edwards cannot establish prejudice because his assertion that an expert could have established that the evidence was cross-contaminated is speculative, see Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (speculation about what an expert could have said is not enough to establish prejudice), and the DNA played a relatively minor role in the state’s case against him, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”).

3. In his second certified claim, Edwards asserts that the trial court’s admission of the allegedly cross-contaminated DNA evidence violated his due process rights. A state court’s evidentiary ruling violates a defendant’s due process rights only if there were no permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from the evidence and the evidence was of such a nature that it necessarily prevented a fair trial. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 923 (9th Cir. 2006). Even assuming the DNA evidence was cross-contaminated and should not have been admitted, Edwards is still unable to demonstrate prejudice because of the relatively minor role the DNA evidence played in his conviction. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Here, there was strong evidence of Edwards’s guilt, and we conclude that Edwards would have been convicted even without the DNA evidence. We thus hold that the trial court’s admission of the DNA evidence did not render Edwards’s trial fundamentally unfair.

4. Edwards also urges that the district court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. We review that contention for abuse of discretion. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edwards’s motion for an evidentiary hearing because, even if the evidence was cross-contaminated, Edwards would not be entitled to habeas relief. See Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 624 (9th Cir. 2010) (an evidentiary hearing is required only when a petitioner’s allegations, if true, would warrant habeas relief).

AFFIRMED.