GAMEZ v. NORRIS II ASPC AKA II ASPC (2018)

MEMORANDUM ***

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Gamez appeals the district court’s denial of his proposed additional language to a jury instruction. He argues that the instruction as-given was an incomplete statement of the law. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.

Gamez, an inmate in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections, sued Corrections Officers Shilo Norris and Wesley Valentine, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him. At trial, the district court gave the following as Jury Instruction 12:

While a violation of Department of Corrections policy may also constitute a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights, you may not simply conclude one follows the other. The plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that each officer violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right regardless of any alleged violation of a Department of Corrections policy.

Gamez sought to highlight Defendants’ alleged violation of a prison policy by proposing the following additional language to the instruction: “Department of Corrections use-of-force policies may be relevant to whether force was applied and [sic] a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” The district court declined Gamez’s proposal as superfluous.¹ The district court also gave a general Eighth Amendment instruction as Jury Instruction 11.

We review de novo whether a jury instruction was “an incomplete, and therefore incorrect, statement of the law․” See Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010). “In evaluating jury instructions, prejudicial error results when, looking to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law was [not] fairly and correctly covered.” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 2001) ).

Jury Instruction 12 already notified the jury that it could consider a violation of prison policy for multiple purposes by stating that a violation of policy “may also constitute a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights.” (Emphasis added). Additionally, in Jury Instruction 11, the district court told the jury to consider, inter alia, “whether the defendant applied the force in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Jury Instruction 11 continued, “[i]n considering [this] factor[ ], you should give deference to prison officials in the adoption and execution of policies.” (Emphasis added). Reviewing the given instructions as a whole, we conclude that they (1) already included the concepts/points in Plaintiff’s proposed language, and (2) accurately stated the law.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff preserved his right to appeal the instruction. Even though Gamez’s reason for challenging the instruction shifted after his initial objection, he distinctly raised the issue to the district court by proposing the additional language. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c); Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011).