PENG CHAN v. TIME WARNER INC (2018)

MEMORANDUM **

Peng Chan appeals from the district court's order denying his post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) in his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chan's Rule 59(e) motion because it was untimely and Chan failed to set forth any basis for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (motion must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of the judgment); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263 (setting forth grounds for relief under Rule 59(e) ).

We do not consider the district court's order denying Chan's motions for recusal and reconsideration, and dismissing the action, because the order is outside the scope of this appeal and the notice of appeal is untimely as to that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) (required contents of notice of appeal), 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) (a Rule 59(e) motion extends the time to file an appeal if timely filed); Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 13, 17-18, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017) (a time limit not prescribed by Congress is a mandatory claim-processing rule and if properly invoked, must be enforced); Demaree v. Pederson, 887 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2018) (Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) is a mandatory claim-processing rule under Hamer).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.