BEN DOV v. SRAGOW AKA (2018)

MEMORANDUM ***

Naora Ben-Dov appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her diversity action alleging state law claims in connection with her late father’s estate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ben-Dov’s action is time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338 (three-year statute of limitations); Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914, 917 (2005) (claim accrues under the delayed discovery rule when the plaintiff has reason to suspect an injury and some wrongful cause).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to deny or strike defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of their alleged failure to meet and confer. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (setting forth standard of review); see also Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he decision of a trial court is reversed under the abuse of discretion standard only when the appellate court is convinced firmly that the reviewed decision lies beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the circumstances.”).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.