UNITED STATES v. PARSADANYAN AKA AKA (2018)

MEMORANDUM ***

Rafael Parsadanyan, Arman Sharopetrosian, and Mher Darbinyan appeal their convictions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

An Allen charge is impermissibly coercive when holdout jurors could interpret the charge “as directed specifically at them.” United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 1992) ). Here, the holdout juror who sent a signed note to the district court asking to be excused could reasonably feel targeted by the district court’s “ ‘neutral form’ of the Allen charge.” Id. (quoting United States v. Steele, 298 F.3d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 2002) ). Although the district court could not read the signature on the note and so did not actually know the holdout juror’s identity, this fact was not conveyed to the jury; therefore, it did not mitigate the Allen charge’s coercive effect on the holdout juror. Nor are we aware of any basis for holding that the coercive effect of an Allen charge in this context depends on whether the holdout juror was voting for a conviction rather than an acquittal. Because the holdout juror here self-identified to the court, and the court thereafter gave an Allen charge, “reversal is necessary.” Williams, 547 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Ajiboye, 961 F.2d at 894); United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530, 531–32 (9th Cir. 1984).

Given our decision, we need not—and do not—reach any other issues argued by the parties.

REVERSED.