CLARK v. DAVIS (2018)

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Douglas Daniel Clark appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) alleging that defendant interfered with the practice of his religion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Clark’s claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief because defendant voluntarily changed the allegedly infringing policy, rendering his claims moot. See Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth factors for evaluating whether defendant’s voluntary cessation of behavior has rendered a case moot); Native Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1514 (9th Cir. 1994) (declaratory relief not appropriate for moot claims).

The district court properly dismissed Clark’s claims seeking monetary damages as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Holley v. Cal. Dep’t. Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010) (state officials acting in their official capacity are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars [an inmate’s] suit for official-capacity damages under RLUIPA”).

We reject as without merit Clark’s contentions regarding judicial misconduct.

Clark’s motion for oral argument (Docket Entry No. 28) is denied.

AFFIRMED.