MEEK v. ZOPAN (2018)

MEMORANDUM **

Charles Phillip Meek appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Meek’s claims stemming from a prior state civil action as barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine because Meek’s claims constitute a “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment, and are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See id. at 1155-56 (the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).

To the extent that Meek’s claims are not barred by Rooker–Feldman, the district court properly dismissed these claims as Heck-barred, as success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Meek’s conviction, and Meek has failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

AFFIRMED.