UNITED STATES v. REED (2019)

[Unpublished]

Norman Eugene Reed pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Reed makes an unpreserved claim that, because he was convicted of a sex offense prior to the passage of SORNA, the retroactive application violates the nondelegation doctrine. Reed concedes that plain-error review applies to his challenge to the constitutionality of the statute of conviction. See Appellant’s Br. at 5; see also United States v. Jennings, 930 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2019).

In 2007, the Attorney General retroactively applied SORNA to sex offenders, acting under the authority delegated by Congress under 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006). We ruled on this issue in United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2013), concluding that “SORNA provides the Attorney General with an intelligible principle, and is a valid delegation of legislative authority.” Id. at 920. After [Reed pleaded guilty], the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue in Gundy v. United States, 17-6086. On June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court rejected the arguments relied upon by [Reed], stating “The question becomes: Did Congress make an impermissible delegation when it instructed the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible? Under this Court’s long-established law, that question is easy. Its answer is no.” Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129, [204] L.Ed.2d [522] (2019). Kuehl remains the binding law in this circuit.

Jennings, 930 F.3d at 1027.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.¹

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

PER CURIAM.