UNITED STATES v. WARD (2020)

ORDER

Charles Ward, Jr., appeals a district court order denying his motion for compassionate release, filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The parties have waived oral argument, and this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

In 2014, Ward was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 262 months in prison after a jury found him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1). At sentencing, the district court rejected Ward's request for a downward variance, citing his “extensive and unrelenting criminal conduct.” We affirmed Ward's conviction and sentence. United States v. Ward, No. 14-5308 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2014).

Ward recently moved for compassionate release, citing the Covid-19 pandemic and his heightened risk of severe complications based on his age—he is 64 years old—and medical conditions, which include heart disease, hypertension, prostate cancer, and liver damage caused by hepatitis C. He also stated that he was not receiving testing or treatment for heavy bleeding in his stool. He argued that these conditions constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A) and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors supported a reduction, citing (1) his statistically low risk of recidivism based on his age, and (2) his performance in prison, where he was described in a recent progress report as a “model inmate” and had completed his GED, earned positive work reviews, served as a mentor to younger inmates, and received no disciplinary actions.

The district court denied the motion on the merits. It declined to decide whether Ward's age and medical conditions were extraordinary and compelling reasons, concluding that, even if they were, he was not eligible for compassionate release because he would be a danger to the community if he were released. The district court also concluded that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release.

We review the district court's denial of compassionate release for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kincaid, 802 F. App'x 187, 188 (6th Cir. 2020). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court “relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, uses an erroneous legal standard, or improperly applies the law.” United States v. Flowers, 963 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 408 (6th Cir. 2007)).

The compassionate release statute permits the district court to reduce a defendant's sentence if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction; that the reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and that the § 3553(a) factors, to the extent they apply, support the reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The applicable policy statement also requires the district court to find that the defendant “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” USSG § 1B1.13(2). The § 3142(g) factors, which govern the granting of release pending trial, include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the weight of the evidence; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including, among other things, his physical and mental health, financial resources, past conduct, criminal history, and history of drug or alcohol abuse; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger posed to any person or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

The district court found that Ward had failed to demonstrate that he would not be a danger to the community if released, citing his substantial criminal history and his past inability to comply with release conditions. The district court commended Ward's significant rehabilitation efforts but concluded that his “good behavior in the controlled environment of prison for eight years” did not mean “that the great danger he posed to other persons for approximately four decades has disappeared and would not manifest itself if [he] were released.” The district court also recognized that Ward was statistically less likely to recidivate in his sixties, but it noted that this was also true when he was in his fifties, as he was when he committed his most recent offense. It thus concluded that his age and rehabilitation were not sufficient to overcome his past record of recidivism and non-compliance with conditions of release, particularly when his release plan would not mitigate his risk of reoffending.

Ward argues that the district court placed too much weight on his criminal history and too little weight on his rehabilitation efforts and his age, but he has failed to demonstrate that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts or otherwise abused its discretion. As noted by the district court, Ward has an extensive criminal history, having “been sentenced on 20 different occasions” in the span of 40 years. To his credit, he does not attempt to minimize the seriousness of this record, arguing instead that, in the eight years since his last offense, he “has shown—as much as he possibly can—that he is unlikely to be a danger to society.” The relevant statutory criteria, however, require the district court to consider a defendant's history when assessing future dangerousness—including his criminal record and supervision violations—and Ward is asking to be released from custody, making his past conduct outside of prison at least as relevant as his conduct in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3). Although the district court recognized that many of Ward's convictions were old, it found a “distinct pattern” of offenses committed while he was under court supervision, either awaiting trial or on probation or parole, and of little time elapsing between release and re-arrest, which “continued unabated” until his most recent offense. Based on that pattern, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to determine that Ward's age and rehabilitative efforts were not sufficient to demonstrate that he would no longer pose a danger to the community if released.

For similar reasons, Ward has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against reducing his sentence. The district court recognized that Ward was at “substantial risk” of contracting Covid-19 in prison and considered his need for medical care, but it concluded that he would be at some risk of contracting Covid-19 even outside of prison and that he had failed to demonstrate that he would receive better medical care if he were released, noting that his release plan did not contain any information about his ability to obtain or pay for such care. The district court also found that early release would not protect the public, citing Ward's criminal history, and that it would create unwarranted sentencing disparities, because Ward had served only 95 months of his sentence.

This was not an abuse of the district court's “broad discretion to determine what sentence will serve § 3553(a)’s statutory objectives.” United States v. Kincaid, 805 F. App'x 394, 395 (6th Cir. 2020) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089, 1093 (6th Cir. 2009)). Ward argues that the district court gave too much weight to his criminal history and too little weight to the risks posed by Covid-19 and the prison's failure to provide necessary treatment. But in a compassionate release proceeding, as at sentencing, the district court “is best situated to balance the § 3553(a) factors.” Kincaid, 802 F. App'x at 189 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). Ward's disagreement with how the district court conducted this balance “is not a sufficient ground for reversal.” United States v. Allen, 819 Fed.Appx. 418, 419 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 2020)); see United States v. Adkins, 729 F.3d 559, 571 (6th Cir. 2013).

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order denying Ward's motion for compassionate release.