UNITED STATES v. DESJARDINS RACINE (2020)

ORDER

Damien Edward Desjardins-Racine, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

In 2019, Desjardins-Racine pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine. The district court sentenced him to 87 months of imprisonment, the bottom of the recommended guidelines range, and he did not appeal.

In April 2020, Desjardins-Racine moved for compassionate release, and he asserted in a supplemental brief filed through appointed counsel that there were extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), because he has asthma and is at especially high risk should he contract Covid-19. He noted that there were many confirmed cases of Covid-19 among both inmates and staff at his prison, FCI Milan, and that the prison's layout does not allow for adequate preventative measures.

The government responded in opposition, arguing that the district court lacked the authority to grant Desjardins-Racine's motion because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and, alternatively, that he had failed to establish that a reduction was supported by extraordinary and compelling reasons or the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

The district court denied the motion, concluding first that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory and that Desjardins-Racine had failed to comply with it. The district court also reviewed the motion on the merits and concluded that Desjardins-Racine had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction because his medical records did not reflect an asthma diagnosis or any other comorbidities, and that, even if he had, relief was not warranted as a matter of discretion because he had served less than 20% of his sentence, had a history of substance abuse, and remained a risk to himself and the community.

On appeal, Desjardins-Racine argues that he did satisfy the exhaustion requirement, pointing to his administrative request for home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). He also argues that compassionate release is warranted based on his asthma and the prison's inadequate response to the spread of Covid-19, and he cites United States v. Head, No. 2:08-cr-00093, 2020 WL 3180149 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2020), as involving similar circumstances.

We review the denial of compassionate release for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kincaid, 802 F. App'x 187, 188 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020)). A defendant's legal eligibility for a sentence reduction is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 778 (6th Cir. 2020).

A district court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One exception to this rule is compassionate release, which allows a district court to reduce a defendant's sentence if it finds, among other things, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Prior to 2018, a motion for compassionate release could be made only by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), but the First Step Act amended the statute so that defendants can move for compassionate release on their own behalf. See United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 834-35 (6th Cir. 2020). A defendant may do so, however, only after he has “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure” of the BOP to bring a motion on his behalf or after thirty days have passed “from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Desjardins-Racine argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is not mandatory and should be excused in light of the potentially catastrophic health consequences of Covid-19. But we recently held that this exhaustion requirement is mandatory when properly invoked, and we declined to carve out “an equitable exception ․ to account for irreparable harm or futility” in cases involving Covid-19. Alam, 960 F.3d at 835. And although Desjardins-Racine points to his administrative request for home confinement as satisfying the exhaustion requirement, that request made no mention of compassionate release and instead sought a different form of relief—a transfer in custody under § 3624(c)(2) and the CARES Act—with different eligibility requirements. Thus, the district court correctly determined that Desjardins-Racine failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order denying Desjardins-Racine's motion for compassionate release.