FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF METROPOLITAN DETROIT v. SINGH SENIOR LIVING LLC (2025)

ORDER

The Fair Housing Center of Metropolitan Detroit (the Center) brought claims against defendants under the federal Fair Housing Act and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. The district court concluded that the Center had standing to bring suit but granted summary judgment to defendants on both claims. The Center timely appealed. For the following reasons, we VACATE the district court's judgment and REMAND the case to the district court for further discovery and argument on the issue of standing.

Because “Article III standing is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived,” it “may be brought up at any time in the proceeding.” Zurich Ins. Co. v. Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 2002). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) injury in fact, (2) traceability, and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Here, the district court concluded that the Center's “devot[ion] [of] resources to testing for discriminatory practices and counteracting those alleged practices” was sufficient, under existing Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, to establish Article III standing. R. 35, Op. & Order, PageID 1220-22. The district court relied on a line of precedent arising out of the Supreme Court case Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). In Havens, the defendants gave false information about housing availability to Black employees of the plaintiff, HOME, a home-counseling organization. 455 U.S. at 368, 102 S.Ct. 1114. This racial steering, the Court reasoned, “perceptibly impaired HOME's ability to provide counseling and referral services for low-and moderate-income homeseekers” and caused a “consequent drain on the organization's resources,” which sufficed to establish Article III standing. Id. at 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114.

In June 2024, after the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court decided FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367, 144 S.Ct. 1540, 219 L.Ed.2d 121 (2024). In Alliance, multiple medical associations sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for loosening regulatory requirements on the drug mifepristone, asserting standing under Havens “based on their incurring costs to oppose [the] FDA's actions.” 602 U.S. at 394, 144 S.Ct. 1540. The Court rejected this argument, explaining that “an organization that has not suffered a concrete injury caused by a defendant's action cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending money to gather information and advocate against the defendant's action.” Id. In distinguishing Alliance from Havens, the Court emphasized the “[c]ritical[ ]” fact that the Havens plaintiff, HOME, “not only was an issue-advocacy organization, but also operated a housing counseling service.” Id. at 395, 144 S.Ct. 1540. Because HOME administered a housing counseling service, the Alliance Court reasoned, the defendant's provision of false information on housing to HOME's employees “directly affected and interfered with HOME's core business activities.” Id.

Alliance thus clarified that the expenditure of resources in opposition to a defendant's actions, standing alone, is insufficient to establish standing under Havens. It is not enough to broadly gesture toward “a drain on an organization's resources” and call it a day, as some of our pre-Alliance cases have done. Miami Valley Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Connor Grp., 725 F.3d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2013); accord Hooker v. Weathers, 990 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1993) (briefly finding that standing exists based on the plaintiff's “devot[ion] [of] resources to investigating the defendants’ practices”). There must be something more—the court must find that the organization has alleged and shown that the conduct challenged in the suit interfered with the organization's “core business activities.” Alliance, 602 U.S. at 395, 144 S.Ct. 1540. If, for example, a defendant's actions interfered with the counseling and referral services that a housing organization provided, that conduct could suffice to establish standing. Id. at 394-95, 144 S.Ct. 1540; Havens, 455 U.S. at 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114.

In supplemental briefing after Alliance, the Center asserts that the defendants’ alleged refusal to accommodate, steering, and provision of false information about their ability to procure and provide American Sign Language services have interfered with the Center's core business activities, resulting in the frustration of its mission, the diversion of its resources, and informational injury. Given that Alliance was not issued until after the district court's decision, the Center did not expressly raise the issue of informational injury before the district court, and the evidentiary record on this issue is sparse. But this is understandable, as the Center did not have reason to believe, prior to this appeal, that it might need to collect evidence of informational injury to establish standing.

Where intervening Supreme Court authority impacts “the relevant [legal] inquir[y],” such that the plaintiff lacked an opportunity to appropriately “tailor[ ]” its discovery, remand may be appropriate. Lindke v. Freed, 114 F.4th 812, 820 (6th Cir. 2024). Indeed, because we are a “court of review, not first view,” it is often the district court—not our court—that is best positioned to determine the application of new law to a particular set of facts. United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2015). Here, a remand for further discovery and argument on the issue of standing is appropriate. See Galicks, Inc. v. NLRB, 383 F. App'x 516 (6th Cir. 2010) (remanding a case sua sponte based on intervening Supreme Court authority). This remand will ensure that the Center has a fair opportunity to develop the record on the defendants’ alleged interference with the Center's core business activities, including the alleged informational injury. In turn, it will give the district court adequate opportunity in the first instance to assess the issue of standing anew, in light of Alliance, on a fully developed record. In doing so, the district court must address on a complete record whether the Center has shown interference with its core business activities, as Alliance instructs.

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court's judgment and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this Order. We express no view on the district court's ruling on the merits.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.