UNITED STATES v. PITT (2020)

Antonio Dashawn Pitt pled guilty, without a written plea agreement, to armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2018); and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2018). The district court sentenced Pitt to 125 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Pitt argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

We review a criminal sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); see United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017). This review requires consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See Blue, 877 F.3d at 517. We have confirmed that Pitt’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019).

To be substantively reasonable, the sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). In assessing substantive reasonableness, we consider “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Pitt argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it does not account for the role his mental illness played in his behavior. To the contrary, the court recognized that Pitt’s behavior was influenced, in part, by his mental illness and, therefore, included recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons and conditions of supervised release designed to ensure that Pitt receives necessary mental health treatment. The court, however, carefully balanced Pitt’s mental health and other mitigating factors identified by counsel with the seriousness of the crimes, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public. Our review convinces us that the court carefully evaluated the § 3553(a) factors and gave due consideration to Pitt’s arguments in mitigation, including his mental illness, when imposing a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. Pitt, therefore, has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness accorded his sentence.

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.