JP MORGAN CHASE BANK v. WAZNEY (2018)

Robert Wazney appeals from the district court's order adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and remanding the underlying foreclosure proceeding back to state court. We dismiss the appeal. Remand orders are generally “not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). The Supreme Court has explained that the appellate restrictions of “§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) [i.e., lack of subject matter jurisdiction and defects in removal procedures] are immune from review under § 1447(d).” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127, 116 S.Ct. 494, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995). Whether a remand order is reviewable is not based on a district court's explicit citation to § 1447(c); “[t]he bar of § 1447(d) applies to any order invoking substantively one of the grounds specified in § 1447(c).” Borneman v. United States, 213 F.3d 819, 824-25 (4th Cir. 2000).

Here, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing § 1447(c). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the district court's order. Thus, we grant JP Morgan Chase Bank's motion to dismiss the appeal. We deny Wazney's motions for a stay pending appeal and for summary judgment, and we dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

PER CURIAM:

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.