ACCARINO III v. TOWN OF MONROE (2021)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellants Rachel Accarino and Anthony Pantuso, III appeal from a judgment entered on December 10, 2020, dismissing their Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim. Plaintiffs allege that on March 30, 2020, six police officers “converged on” and searched the front, side, and back yards of their home without a warrant or probable cause. App'x at 9. Plaintiffs sued the Town of Monroe and Kenneth Kellogg in his official capacity as First Selectman (together, “Defendants”), asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state-law claims for violations of Connecticut's Constitution. On appeal, Plaintiffs focus on their section 1983 claims and contend that “[t]he District Court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs ․ failed sufficiently to identify an unconstitutional policy, procedure, or custom of the Defendant Town that caused their injuries.” Appellant's Br. at 3. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

“We review de novo a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,” and we will affirm unless “the complaint contains sufficient factual matter that, accepted as true, states a plausible claim for relief.” Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 61 (2d Cir. 2015). “To hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).

Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against the Town of Monroe fails because they provide no factual allegations to support the existence of an official policy or custom. Instead, Plaintiffs rely exclusively on their cursory description of a single incident and a generic allegation that it occurred “pursuant to an official policy, practice or procedure.” App'x at 10. Although we must accept Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Plaintiffs’ conclusory statement that a municipal policy or custom existed thus does not support their claim. See Montero v. City of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386, 403–04 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he mere assertion that a municipality has ․ a custom or policy is insufficient [to state a claim for municipal liability] in the absence of allegations of fact tending to support, at least circumstantially, such an inference.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Setting aside Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, we cannot reasonably infer the existence of a municipal policy or custom from the single incident described in the complaint. See, e.g., Pierre v. Doorley, 830 F. App'x 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (“[Plaintiff] attempts to rest his municipal claims on entirely his own experiences, which is insufficient to sustain a Monell claim, even at the pleading stage.” (citing Sorlucco v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1992)).

Finally, “a § 1983 suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity is treated as an action against the municipality itself,” so Plaintiffs’ claim against Kellogg in his official capacity fails for the same reasons. Coon v. Town of Springfield, 404 F.3d 683, 687 (2d Cir. 2005).¹

We have considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiffs failed to brief and therefore waived their state-law claims. See Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm'n, 768 F.3d 183, 200 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).