UNITED STATES v. GONZALEZ (2021)

SUMMARY ORDER

Jazmin C. Gonzalez appeals from the District Court's judgment insofar as it principally sentenced her to two, 46-month, concurrent terms of imprisonment, to be followed by a six-year term of supervised release.¹ Gonzalez contends that the sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to remand.

Gonzalez first argues that the District Court imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence by failing sufficiently to state its reasons for the 46-month sentence as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). For the following reasons, we agree, and, on plain error review, we identify such error. We therefore remand for resentencing. In light of this disposition, we do not reach Gonzalez's substantive reasonableness challenge.

Section 3553(c) requires that, “at the time of sentencing, [the district court] state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). A district court commits procedural error (among other ways) by failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. See generally United States v. Genao, 869 F.3d 136, 140-43 (2d Cir. 2017). In imposing a sentence, the court must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented and explain its choice. United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2020). When “a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.” Id. at 119.² The district court must, however, “provide some oral account of its reasoning that would permit an understanding of how [it] weighed the relevant considerations and selected the sentence imposed.” Id. at 120; see also United States v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269, 276 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that district court's sentencing explanation must “permit meaningful appellate review of the enhancement the district court imposed”).

Adopting a defendant's presentence investigation report (“PSR”) in open court has in some circumstances been held to satisfy § 3553(c)’s requirement of an in-court explanation—for example, when the PSR's factual findings are sufficient to support the sentence and the findings relied on are evident. See United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 539-40 (2d Cir. 2007); Molina, 356 F.3d at 276-77. Still, the district court must orally provide a sufficient basis for the defendant or a reviewing court “to determine why the district court did what it did.” Carter, 489 F.3d at 540. Simply adopting the PSR on the record is not adequate without some commentary about what facts in the PSR drove the sentence imposed. See United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A]doption of the PSR does not suffice if the PSR itself does not state enough facts to permit meaningful appellate review.”). A sentencing court may not “blindly rest on the existence of the Guidelines,” United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2007), or rely on “the defendant, the public, and appellate courts” to infer “the rationale for a particular sentence.” Genao, 869 F.3d at 141-42.

Here, the District Court stated that its sentencing decision was based on a “thorough[ ]” review of the record and told Gonzalez that it deemed the sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to meet the goals of sentencing” based on Gonzalez's history, characteristics, and background. App'x at 55-56. It further stated that it had considered “everything” in Gonzalez's “whole life, good and bad.” Id. at 56. Without any commentary, it adopted the “factual information and the guidelines applications as contained in [the PSR].” Id. at 54.

This was not enough. Although a legally adequate explanation need clear only “a low threshold,” Rosa, 957 F.3d at 119, and although the court need not always “mention the required factors, much less explain how each factor affected the court's decision,” United States v. Banks, 464 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2006), the District Court's brief statement here provides no analysis and points to nothing about Gonzalez or her crime of conviction by way of explaining the sentence. We and Gonzalez alike are left with an insufficient basis to determine why the District Court imposed two 46-month sentences, to run concurrently.

On review, we conclude that this is error that is obvious and plain; that affects Gonzalez's substantial rights; and that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Rosa, 957 F.3d at 117-18. As to the last factor, we rely on the Supreme Court's comment about the § 3553(c) requirement: “A public statement of those reasons [for imposing a sentence] helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust” in the judicial institution. Id. at 121 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). Maintaining that trust is of critical importance.

We therefore remand for resentencing.

* * *

For the reasons set forth above, we REMAND the case to the District Court with instructions to VACATE the sentence first imposed and to conduct resentencing proceedings in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).

FOOTNOTES

1.   On December 5, 2019, Gonzalez waived indictment and pled guilty to a two-count information charging one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition after a felony conviction, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and one count of distributing heroin and cocaine, see 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). She was sentenced on July 6, 2020.

2.   Unless otherwise noted, in quoting caselaw, this Order omits all alterations, citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks.