MOODY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY (2021)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Russel Moody appeals the district court's judgment, entered June 18, 2020, dismissing his complaint against defendant-appellee Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) challenging the Commissioner's denial of his claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. By memorandum decision and order also entered June 18, 2020, the district court denied Moody's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Commissioner's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.

“In reviewing a district court's decision upholding a decision of the Commissioner, we review the administrative record de novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although we do not require that every conflict in a record be reconciled by the ALJ,” we do require “sufficient specificity to enable us to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moody argues that “the ALJ failed to properly explain” his reasoning in weighing the medical evidence and his “conclusions are contradicted by opinion and evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 24. Moody further argues that the ALJ failed to properly develop the record. For substantially the reasons articulated by the district court, we are unpersuaded.

First, the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his opinion, including the relative weight he assigned to the medical evidence. See Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 178 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (“An ALJ need not recite every piece of evidence that contributed to the decision, so long as the record permits us to glean the rationale of an ALJ's decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In fact, as the ALJ explained, he weighed some of the conflicting medical evidence in Moody's favor. See, e.g., App'x at 37 (finding that the state agency consultive examiner “understated [Moody's] limitations” and “accord[ing] this assessment limited weight.”). And, as the district court noted, the record contains sufficient support for the ALJ's finding that Moody was capable of performing the full range of sedentary work. See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Dkt. 7 at 538 (Moody was “a well developed, well nourished patient who [wa]s awake, alert, and in no acute distress,” had a normal gait, and “move[d] quite well ․ getting up and down from [his] chair quite frequently”); id. at 349-356 (Moody reports that, even with his back pain, he is still able to lift weights, prepare meals, and perform non-repetitive household chores).

Second, we agree with the district court that the ALJ adequately developed the record. The ALJ provided Moody's counsel with additional time to supplement the record after the first hearing. Counsel provided the ALJ with additional documentation, and did not indicate during the second hearing that there were any outstanding documents. Further, while Moody argues that the ALJ erred in failing to identify the physician with the illegible signature, the ALJ nonetheless considered the unidentified physician's opinion in making his decision.

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We have considered Moody's remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.