UNITED STATES v. James McCloud, Kassin Rivers, Defendants. (2021)

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Rodney Griffin appeals from a judgment of conviction in which he was sentenced to fifty-seven months of imprisonment for bank robbery, to be followed by five years of supervised release. On appeal Griffin challenges his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred in imposing two conditions of supervised release. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Griffin challenges the imposition of a standard supervised release condition, which authorizes a probation officer to require Griffin to notify third parties if the officer determines that Griffin poses a risk to them (the “risk condition”). In light of our decision in United States v. Boles,¹ the government consents to vacatur of this condition.² We vacate the risk condition and remand for the District Court to consider our decision in Boles and whether any condition that complies with that decision should be imposed.

Griffin also challenges the imposition of a special condition of supervised release, which requires him to “submit his person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)), other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, or office” to a search by the probation officer (the “search condition”).³ He argues the search condition should be vacated for several reasons, including that it is excessively broad, that nothing about his crime of conviction suggests a reason to impose such a condition, and because an explanation for its imposition was not given by the District Court. The government consents to vacatur of this condition on the ground that no adequate explanation was given.⁴ We therefore vacate the search condition.⁵

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the risk condition and the search condition and we REMAND to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this order. In the interest of judicial economy, any further appeal shall be directed to this panel.

FOOTNOTES

1.   914 F.3d 95, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2019).

2.   Appellee Br. at 11.

3.   App'x 100.

4.   Appellee Br. at 13.

5.   We note that the search condition's language appears to be unclear as to whether it is intended to apply to an employer's computer equipment or electronic devices furnished to Griffin for use in the employer's business, which could impact Griffin's future employment prospects. We further admit some puzzlement over how this search condition is reasonably related to Griffin's crime of conviction (bank robbery).Nevertheless, nothing in our decision is intended to preclude the District Court from imposing a search condition on remand, to the extent that it determines the condition is “reasonably related to (i) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, and (ii) the purposes of sentencing, including the need to afford adequate deterrence [and] to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant․” Boles, 914 F.3d at 111 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). If the District Court decides to reimpose such a condition on remand, it should take care to provide an explanation for its decision to do so.