WOODSTOCK VENTURES LC LLC v. WOODSTOCK ROOTS LLC LLC LP LLC LLC (2021)

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendants-Appellants Woodstock Roots, LLC, et al. (collectively, “Roots”), appeal the denial of a preliminary injunction that they sought against Plaintiffs-Appellees Woodstock Ventures, LC, et al. (collectively, “Ventures”). In the underlying action, Ventures sued Roots for trademark infringement, claiming Roots's products infringed on Ventures's use of the “Woodstock” mark in connection with the sale of recreational marijuana and related products. Roots counterclaimed for trademark infringement based on its federal registration of the “Woodstock” mark in connection with “smokers’ articles.” Roots then sought a preliminary injunction against Ventures based on its counterclaim for trademark infringement. The district court (Gardephe, J.) declined to enter a preliminary injunction, ruling that, even if Roots had priority in the “Woodstock” mark in connection with “smokers’ articles,” it did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits because it had not shown a likelihood of consumer confusion. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, and refer to them only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. Messih, 224 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2000). “Such an abuse of discretion ordinarily consists of either applying an incorrect legal standard or relying on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1992)). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation” and the balance of hardships tips “decidedly in the plaintiff's favor; (2) a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction; (3) that the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiff's favor; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by the issuance of an injunction.” Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (citing Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2010)). The standard is demanding: “[I]njunctive relief [is] an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)). Such relief should not be granted “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997).

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365). Roots bore a heavy burden in seeking a preliminary injunction. It has failed on appeal to identify any clear error in the district court's factual findings underlying its analysis of the likelihood of success on the merits. We conclude that the district court acted within the permissible bounds of its discretion in denying the requested preliminary injunction.

We express no opinion on the merits or strength of the parties’ underlying claims.

The District Court's order is AFFIRMED.