Kristin Norton, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee, v. 10 (2021)

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Matthew Galligan (“Galligan”) appeals from a March 6, 2020 order of the district court denying in part and granting in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs Rock Williams and Kristin Norton (together, “Plaintiffs”) assert that Galligan (as well as other defendants not involved in this appeal) violated their Fourth Amendment rights by entering their residential property without a warrant in order to remove items in the backyard that they had recovered from foreclosed properties and were keeping for sale. Galligan contends that Plaintiffs were operating a junkyard that posed an immediate danger to the community and that, accepting Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Appellant's Br. at 32–33. The district court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there are genuine issues of fact material to the qualified immunity determination that must be resolved by a jury. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

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“State executive officials ‘are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’ ” Simon v. City of N.Y., 893 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018)). “A right is clearly established when its ‘contours ․ are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). Galligan contends that the undisputed facts entitle him to qualified immunity because a reasonable official could have believed that warrantless entry onto Plaintiffs’ property was permissible to address an immediate hazard created by Plaintiffs’ use of their property for commercial purposes. See Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the Supreme Court and this Court have “permitted warrantless administrative searches of a person's residence [when] exigent circumstances exist [or] business was conducted in the home”). For the reasons that follow, we agree.

Galligan argues that Plaintiffs’ backyard storage of material recovered from foreclosed properties for later sale at flea markets, auctions, and the like created dangerous conditions such that a reasonable official could have concluded that his actions were justified based, in turn, on the exigent circumstances exception, the community caretaking exception and, also significant, the “Immediate Action” provision of the Town of South Windsor's anti-blight ordinance. We have previously said that the “enforcement of a presumptively valid statute creates a heavy presumption in favor of qualified immunity.” Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 104 (2d Cir. 2003). To be sure, this presumption can be overcome where a law is “plainly unconstitutional” or an enforcement action is “clearly unlawful.” Id. This standard, however, is not met on the undisputed facts here.

South Windsor's anti-blight ordinance authorized Galligan to take immediate action in the face of conditions representing “an immediate danger ․ to [the] health, safety or welfare of the residents of the town.” J. App'x at 480. This authority is akin to the exception to the warrant requirement that allows officials to enter without warrant, even on residential property, where “the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to believe that there was an urgent need to render aid or take action.” United States v. Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2008)). We express no opinion on the constitutionality of South Windsor's “Immediate Action” ordinance but, because it resembles the well-established exigent exception to the warrant requirement described in Caraballo, we cannot say that any reasonable official would have realized that this ordinance is plainly unconstitutional.

Nor can we say that Galligan's enforcement action was clearly unlawful. The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that Plaintiffs kept a variety of unusual objects in their backyard, causing it to resemble a junkyard. The question is not whether the Plaintiff's activities actually created an emergency, but whether a reasonable official could have perceived one. We therefore need not resolve the contested questions of fact the district court identified to conclude that, even assuming arguendo that all such questions are resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor, a reasonable official could have concluded that Plaintiffs’ activities posed an urgent threat to the community and, as a result, that action under the relevant provision of the anti-blight ordinance was appropriate.

We have considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court is REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Galligan.