UNITED STATES v. BLEAU (2021)

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Keith Bleau (“Bleau”) pleaded guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography and was sentenced to concurrent 78-month terms of imprisonment and fifteen years’ supervised release. On appeal, Bleau challenges a condition of his supervised release prohibiting him from having direct contact with minors without first obtaining permission from his probation officer (“Special Condition No. 2”). This appeal returns to us for the second time. The District Court re-imposed Special Condition No. 2 after a remand from this Court “with instructions that the District Court either state on the record[ ] its reasons for imposing that special condition, or modify the sentence to eliminate that special condition.” United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 44 (2d Cir. 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“A district court retains wide latitude in imposing conditions of supervised release, and we therefore review a decision to impose a condition for abuse of discretion.” United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2008). An abuse of discretion is “[a]n erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United States v. Bello, 310 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we cannot find that the District Court abused its discretion, when, after its review of the record and the arguments raised by counsel, it explained that Special Condition No. 2 is reasonably related to the sentencing goals of protecting the public from further crimes of Bleau and promoting Bleau's rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). Contrary to Bleau's argument that the condition is unreasonable because there was no indication that he ever contacted or attempted to contact a child, we have previously approved an identical condition for a defendant who had “never previously contacted or attempted to contact children” but for whom the District Court, like the District Court here, found the condition justified after a reasoned and individualized assessment. United States v. Likens, 831 F. App'x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2020). Special Condition No. 2 is also not unduly restrictive—Bleau may still have pre-approved contact with minors and he is permitted unapproved incidental contact with minors during daily activities in public places. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). This distinguishes Special Condition No. 2 from the condition we considered—and rejected—in United States v. Jenkins, which involved a 25-year term of supervised release and banned both direct and indirect contact with minors unless supervised by a person approved by the Probation Department. 854 F.3d 181, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2017).

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Bleau on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the November 13, 2019 judgment of conviction of the District Court.