LOWELL v. 10 (2020)

AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-appellants Miriam Lowell and Seth Healey (“plaintiffs”) appeal the decision of the district court issued November 18, 2019, denying their motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs brought the action below seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages against defendant-appellant Vermont Department for Children and Families (“DCF”) and certain DCF officials. DCF had brought a proceeding against plaintiffs seeking to investigate and determine whether to substantiate a report of child abuse or neglect based on purportedly false allegations. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to stop DCF from conducting an administrative hearing and listing their names on Vermont's child protection registry. In its ruling, the district court concluded that the Younger abstention doctrine barred plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss the action, noting that Younger abstention did not apply to plaintiffs' claims for damages. This appeal followed. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo whether the requirements for abstention have been met. See Disability Rights New York v. New York, 916 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2019); Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2002). Although the findings of facts are reviewed for clear error, whether those facts support a finding that the case meets an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo. See id. at 198.

As a general matter, Younger abstention requires federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over state-level proceedings. Three types of proceedings trigger Younger abstention: 1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions,” 2) state “civil enforcement proceedings,” and 3) proceedings involving state courts “perform[ing] their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. U.S. 69, 70, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). Moreover, after applying the categorical Sprint approach, this court will consider three additional, non-dispositive factors to determine whether abstention is appropriate: 1) whether there is a “pending state proceeding,” 2) whether that proceeding “implicates an important state interest,” and 3) whether “the state proceeding affords an adequate opportunity for judicial review of ․ federal constitutional claims.” Falco v. Justices of Matrimonial Parts of Supreme Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F. 3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Altogether, even if Younger's prerequisites are satisfied, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction if the plaintiff can make a showing of “bad faith, harassment or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Id. (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 54, 91 S.Ct. 746).

The district court correctly concluded that Vermont's substantiation process is akin to a criminal prosecution, falling within Younger's second category. In determining whether a civil enforcement action is akin to a criminal proceeding, we consider whether the action involved a state sanctioning a party “for some wrongful act,” was “initiated [by the State] to sanction the federal plaintiff,” and involved “[i]nvestigations [that] culminat[e] in the filing of a formal complaint or charges.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79-80, 134 S.Ct. 584. The substantiation process at issue here possessed these features. Therefore, DCF's proceeding constituted an ongoing state proceeding akin to a criminal prosecution.

The substantiation proceedings also satisfy the additional Middlesex factors. Vermont has a vital interest in protecting the well-being of its children. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 435, 99 S.Ct. 2371 (“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.”). Moreover, the state proceedings provide a sufficient forum for review of federal constitutional claims. After an accusation of wrongdoing, DCF can initiate an investigation. Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 33 § 4915, 4915a, 4915b. If DCF finds that the claims are substantiated, it provides notice of that fact to the accused. It also informs the accused that DCF can place the individual on the child protection registry. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33 § 4916a(a). The accused is notified of the right to request administrative review of the decision, id., which is conducted by a neutral arbiter who is not an employee of DCF, id. § 4916a(f). The burden of proof rests on DCF and the accused has the right to present documentary evidence and other evidence. Id. §§ 4916a(d), a(e). A person's name is not placed on the registry until after the accused is granted an administrative review, and the substantiation is upheld. Id. § 4916a(h). The accused can appeal that decision to the Human Services Board. Id. §§ 4916a(i), b. That decision, in turn may be appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. Id. tit. 3 § 3091(f). Accordingly, plaintiffs have an opportunity to raise their constitutional claims at the hearing before the Human Services Board and before the Vermont Supreme Court.

Plaintiffs argue that this review of their constitutional claims arrives too late, beyond the point that their names are listed on the child protection registry, potentially affecting their employment in an irreparable way. Plaintiffs' names, however, have not been placed on the child-protection registry, as the state has not held the administrative review not entirely made clear by the record. Moreover, in Spargo v. New York State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2003), this Court held that the “ability to raise constitutional claims in subsequent 'state-court judicial review of [an underlying] administrative proceeding' is sufficient to provide plaintiffs with a meaningful opportunity to seek effective relief through state proceedings and bar federal courts from taking jurisdiction over the same claims while the state proceeding is pending” (emphasis added). Thus, the state process provides sufficient opportunity to raise constitutional claims.

Plaintiffs also argue that the district court should have applied the “bad faith” exception to Younger, and exercised jurisdiction because they have shown “bad faith” and “harassment” by defendants. Diamond “D,” 282 F.3d at 198 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 54). The district court correctly held that the actions alleged in the complaint are not sufficient to sustain a finding of bad faith. To show bad faith, a plaintiff must show that “the state proceeding was initiated with and is animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate motive” and “ha[s] no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome.” Diamond “D,” 282 F.3d at 199. A state proceeding that “is legitimate in its purposes, but unconstitutional in its execution -- even when the violations of constitutional rights are egregious -- will not warrant the application of the bad faith exception.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Here, the case was initially brought to the attention of a mental health counselor by the accusations of Lowell's daughter, not by the reporting of a DCF employee. Hence, the suggestion that the state proceeding was therefore initiated with a harassing or retaliatory motive, or that the state had no reasonable expectation of a favorable outcome, is not plausible, and plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the bad faith exception should apply.

We have reviewed plaintiffs' remaining arguments on appeal and conclude they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court denying plaintiffs' claims for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief.