UNITED STATES v. RADIN (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Following a four-day bench trial before a magistrate judge (Henry B. Pitman, M.J.), defendant-appellant Lidya Maria Radin was convicted of misdemeanor counts of disorderly conduct and failing to comply with signs and directions on federal property (the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse (the “Courthouse”) at 500 Pearl Street) in violation of 41 C.F.R. §§ 102-74.385 and 102-74.390(a). She was sentenced to ten days' imprisonment. She appealed to a district judge (Richard J. Sullivan, J.), who affirmed the convictions and sentence by opinion and order entered March 18, 2018. This appeal followed. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

Radin argues that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to preside over her trial and other proceedings. We disagree. Magistrate judges have jurisdiction “to try persons accused of, and sentence persons convicted of, misdemeanors․” 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (“[M]agistrate judges ․ shall have ․ the power to conduct trials under section 3401, title 18, United States Code, in conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section.”); Local Criminal Rule 59.1 (“Magistrate Judges are hereby specially designated to exercise the jurisdiction set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3401.”). While § 3401 also allows “[a]ny person charged with a misdemeanor, other than a petty offense[, to] elect ․ to be tried before a district judge,” 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (emphasis added), the regulations under which Radin was convicted concerned petty offenses, see 18 U.S.C. § 19 (providing that “the term ‘petty offense’ means,” inter alia, “a Class C misdemeanor”); 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(8) (providing that “authorized term of imprisonment” for a Class C misdemeanor is “not more than thirty days”); 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.450 (setting maximum penalty of 30 days in jail for violating regulations related to the regulations at issue here).

Radin also argues that the Courthouse is not federal property within the meaning of the relevant regulations. We construe the argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to that element of the offenses.¹ We review a sufficiency challenge de novo, and “must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and uphold the conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

For purposes of the regulations under which Radin was convicted, the “property” on which the offense occurred must be “under the authority of GSA.” 41 C.F.R. § 102–74.365. The Government's witnesses testified that the Courthouse is under the control of the GSA and is federal property. In addition, the Government entered into evidence a picture of the sign advising visitors to the Courthouse that it is federal property. We conclude that the evidence presented by the Government was sufficient to establish that the Courthouse was federal property within the meaning of the regulations.

We have reviewed Radin's remaining arguments on appeal and conclude they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and opinion and order of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The courts below plainly had subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal proceeding against Radin, because the offenses with which she was charged are federal crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231; United States v. Yousef, 750 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over federal criminal prosecutions by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which vests the district courts with the power to hear 'all offenses against the laws of the United States.'”). Thus, to the extent Radin's argument is construed as a challenge to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, the argument is meritless.