GONZALEZ v. ADK (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Michael Gonzalez, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Gonzalez claims that the defendants violated his right under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as prison policies prohibited him from wearing more than one strand of beads around his neck while confined in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), even though his practice of Santeria obligated him to wear additional strands and prohibited him from obtaining matches or lighters that he needed to prepare burnt offerings for worship. He further claims that the defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, while allowing Native American inmates to burn herbs for religious reasons, the defendants did not allow him to do the same. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on Gonzalez's First Amendment claims, reasoning that the limit on the number of strands of beads Gonzalez could wear in the SHU was reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of preventing inmate self-harm and that the prohibition on matches and lighters was justifiable on institutional safety grounds. A jury found for the defendants on the equal protection claim, and the district court subsequently denied Gonzalez's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion for a new trial. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, “resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing] all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep't, 706 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).¹ And we review the denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, “but where the basis of the Rule 59 motion is an erroneous jury instruction, we review the jury instructions de novo.” Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 569 (2d Cir. 2017). “It is well settled that we may affirm a district court's decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds not relied upon by the district court.” CBF Indústria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58, 78 (2d Cir. 2017).

Upon such review, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the free exercise claims because the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on those claims. “Qualified immunity protects officials from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2010). Gonzalez points to no case from this Court or the Supreme Court clearly establishing that an inmate has a First Amendment right to wear more than one strand of religious beads in the SHU or to use matches or a lighter to burn offerings, and we have identified none. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 536–38 (2d Cir. 2010).

We turn next to the district court's denial of Gonzalez's Rule 59 motion. In denying the motion, the district court rejected Gonzalez's argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. There are conflicting precedents in this circuit regarding whether we can even review such a denial. Compare Rasanen v. Doe, 723 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] district court's denial of a motion for new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds is not reviewable on appeal.”), with ING Global v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds). We need not resolve this conflict today because, even assuming that such a denial is reviewable, Gonzalez has not shown that the verdict should be vacated. Where a verdict was based “almost entirely on the jury's assessments of credibility,” it “should not be disturbed except in an egregious case, to correct a seriously erroneous result, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418–19 (2d Cir. 2012). Here, the verdict relied on the jury's assessment of witnesses’ credibility, and Gonzalez has not shown that the verdict is the sort of seriously erroneous result that should be disturbed. See Heller v. Champion Int'l Corp., 891 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Credibility issues [over witnesses’ conflicting testimonies] are for the jury not the court to resolve.”).

Lastly, Gonzalez's proposed jury instructions regarding an interactive process for devising a religious accommodation have no basis in existing law. Cf. Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 156 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law.”). Therefore, the district court properly denied the Rule 59 motion to the extent it was based on jury instructions.

Gonzalez has abandoned other claims and issues that he did not raise in his appellate brief. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995). We have considered all of Gonzalez's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alterations, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted.