OLIVER v. NEW YORK STATE POLICE (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Jean Oliver sued her former employer, the New York State Police (“NYSP”), its former superintendent, Joseph D'Amico, and others for employment discrimination and retaliation. She generally alleged she was sexually harassed and fired based on falsified disciplinary charges when she complained about the harassment, and that the NYSP failed to properly follow its procedures for disciplinary hearings. In 2019, four months after deposing D'Amico and learning that he had failed to follow those procedures, Oliver moved, pro se, for a preliminary injunction seeking reinstatement to her former position as an NYSP investigator. The District Court denied the injunction because Oliver had not shown irreparable harm and her delay in filing her motion undermined any argument that she would suffer irreparable harm. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review a decision on a motion for a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007). A district court abuses its discretion if it relies on a clearly erroneous evaluation of the evidence or applies the wrong legal standard. Id.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Oliver's motion for a preliminary injunction. A party seeking a preliminary injunction against governmental action must demonstrate (1) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction and (2) a likelihood of succeeding on the merits. Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 635–37 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated on other grounds, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 2019, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2020). Irreparable harm “is the single most important prerequisite.” Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To show irreparable harm, “[t]he movant must demonstrate an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Irreparable harm exists “where, but for the grant of equitable relief, there is a substantial chance that upon final resolution of the action the parties cannot be returned to the positions they previously occupied.” Brenntag Int'l Chems., Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 249–50 (2d Cir. 1999).

The District Court applied the correct legal standard. We need not decide whether it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to conclude that Oliver's delay in seeking a preliminary injunction alone undermined a claim of irreparable harm because we conclude that, even absent delay, her injuries were not irreparable. “As a general matter, because monetary injury can be estimated and compensated, the likelihood of such injury usually does not constitute irreparable harm.” Brenntag Int'l Chems., Inc., 175 F.3d at 249. However, the irreparable-harm requirement might be satisfied if a monetary award would cause the movant to go bankrupt absent interim relief. Miss Am. Org. v. Mattel, Inc., 945 F.2d 536, 546 (2d Cir. 1991).

Oliver argues that, absent a preliminary injunction, she (1) was unlikely to be reinstated by the NYSP in time to earn a pension; (2) had been unable to secure employment by other law enforcement agencies and suffered from a loss of reputation as a result of her termination; (3) had been forced to start a small business as a result of her termination, but might lose the business if she was not reinstated; and (4) had been forced to take work in the military and live separately from her family while on tours of duty. But “irreparable harm is not [generally] established in employee discharge cases by financial distress or inability to find other employment, unless truly extraordinary circumstances are shown.” Holt v. Continental Grp., Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 90–91 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 91–92 & n.68, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974)). Although irreparable harm may be shown in retaliatory discharge cases where there is evidence that the plaintiff's termination chilled other employees’ ability to report discrimination or from providing the plaintiff with evidence to support her claim, see id. at 91, no such argument is made here. Nor does Oliver argue that she was facing bankruptcy or financial insolvency as a result of her unemployment. Oliver has maintained employment in the military and runs a small business with her family. Oliver's loss of reputation and difficulty finding other employment also does not constitute an irreparable injury. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 91–92, 94 S.Ct. 937; Guitard v. U.S. Sec'y of Navy, 967 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1992). Although Oliver's separation from her family may be the type of “extraordinary circumstance[ ]” contemplated in Holt, we are not persuaded that such circumstances were demonstrated in this case.

Because Oliver did not show irreparable harm, which is “an absolute requirement for a preliminary injunction,” Holt, 708 F.2d at 90, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion.

In short, we are affirming the District Court's denial of a preliminary junction because, under our standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction, Oliver still has available to her a remedy at law in the form of money damages. We note, however, that nothing in this order should be construed as our casting any doubt on the merits of Oliver's claims in the underlying litigation. Indeed, we found entirely plausible Oliver's explanation for the four-month delay in seeking an injunction. We expressly reject the proposition stated by counsel for Appellees at oral argument that the issues in this appeal were “mooted” by the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Appellees with respect to Oliver's wrongful discharge claim. Accordingly, particularly because Oliver has retaliation claims that are still pending before the District Court, this order does not foreclose any potential remedies available to Oliver when the case proceeds upon remand, including reinstatement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the May 6, 2019 order of the District Court.