GREEN v. SEMPLE (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Courtney Green (“Green”), proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the District Court dismissing sua sponte his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While incarcerated, Green sued various Connecticut corrections and parole officers, alleging that his equal protection rights were violated by the implementation of a parole-eligibility policy that treated him differently than Johnny Johnson, who Green alleges was a similarly situated inmate.

The District Court concluded that Green failed to plausibly allege that he (Green) and Johnson were similarly situated; indeed, the District Court explained that, “based on the commission dates of the inmates’ crimes, the Defendants have implemented the appropriate policy to distinguish between inmates whose rights have been repealed, such as [Green], from those whose rights cannot be denied ex post facto, such as Johnson.” Green v. Semple, No. 3:19-CV-410 (CSH), 2019 WL 2016779, at *8 (D. Conn. May 7, 2019).¹ Accordingly, the District Court dismissed Green's complaint for failure to state an equal protection claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The instant appeal followed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1999). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Pro se submissions are reviewed with “special solicitude,” and “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A plaintiff who does not allege that he belongs to a particular class or group may prevail on an equal protection claim under a “class of one” theory by plausibly alleging that he was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). The similarly-situated comparator must be “prima facie identical” to the plaintiff; put another way, “no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate government policy; and ․ the similarity in circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendant acted on the basis of a mistake.” Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On review, we affirm the judgment of dismissal for substantially the reasons given by the District Court in its thorough May 7, 2013 screening order dismissing the case with prejudice, see Green, 2019 WL 2016779, at *1-8, as well as its order denying Green's motion for reconsideration, Green v. Semple, No. 3:19-CV-410 (CSH), 2019 WL 2358023, at *1-3 (D. Conn. June 4, 2019).

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the remaining arguments raised by Green on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the May 10, 2019 judgment of the District Court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “The Constitution forbids the passage of ex post facto laws, a category that includes ‘[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.’ ” Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 532-33, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)).