MERCED v. PONTE (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Nakkia Merced, pro se, sued defendants-appellees City of New York and various City agencies and officials (“defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, New York Civil Service Law (“CSL”) §§ 75 and 76, and New York Civil Rights Law (“CRL”) § 50-a. Merced alleged that she was unlawfully terminated from her position as a tenured Correction Officer without due process because: Administrative Law Judge John B. Spooner was not properly designated to conduct her pre-termination hearing under CSL § 75; Department of Corrections Commissioner Joseph Ponte unlawfully relied on Spooner's Report & Recommendation in terminating her; the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings posted her disciplinary record online, which violated CRL § 50-a; the New York City Civil Service Commission failed to review the transcript of her pre-termination hearing on appeal, which violated CSL § 76; and New York City conspired to deprive tenured public employees of their employment without due process. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss Merced's amended complaint holding, inter alia, that her claims were barred by res judicata because she litigated all but one of the claims that she raised in district court (CRL § 50-a) in her appeal to the New York City Civil Service Commission and in her N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 proceeding (“Article 78 proceeding”) in state court, and she could have raised that claim in her Article 78 petition. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002), “accepting as true all factual claims in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor,” Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We also review de novo the district court's application of res judicata. Bank of N.Y. v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F.3d 905, 919 (2d Cir. 2010). Pro se litigants are entitled to “special solicitude,” and their complaints are interpreted “to raise the strongest claims [they] suggest.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Upon de novo review, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata because both the Civil Service Commission appeal and Article 78 proceeding were adjudications on the merits, and the claims asserted below were, or could have been, raised in the prior state court actions. See Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 284-85 (2d Cir. 2000); Taylor v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 433 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming district court decision holding that res judicata prevented consideration of claims that could have been raised in Article 78 proceeding). We therefore affirm the judgment on res judicata grounds for substantially the reasons set forth by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned March 13, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Order.

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We have considered Merced's remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.