LEE v. SAUL (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Danny Lee, pro se, sued the Acting Secretary of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in 2015 for employment discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and for failure to make reasonable accommodations, hostile work environment, and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Lee, who claims to have a physical disability – avascular necrosis of the hip – alleged that the SSA discriminated against him based on his race, color, sex, religion, national origin, and disability; failed to reasonably accommodate his disability by not supplying him with a functional printer, an exclusively electronic caseload, and disabled parking; subjected him to a hostile work environment; and retaliated against him for lodging Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaints by assigning him to process certain paper cases in June 2011 despite his request for an electronic caseload. In 2017, the district court dismissed all of Lee’s claims except for retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. In 2019, the district court granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim. Lee appealed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We decline to reach the merits of Lee’s claims, as even a generous reading of Lee’s papers reveals that he waived all of his claims on appeal. Although we “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest,” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted), pro se appellants must still comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), which “requires appellants in their briefs to provide the court with a clear statement of the issues on appeal,” Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998). Thus, despite affording pro se litigants “some latitude in meeting the rules governing litigation,” we “normally will not[ ] decide issues that a party fails to raise in his or her appellate brief.” Id. at 209; see also Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631, 632–33 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Although we accord filings from pro se litigants a high degree of solicitude, even a litigant representing himself is obliged to set out identifiable arguments in his principal brief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor will we usually decide issues that an appellant raises only in passing. See, e.g., Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 728 F.3d 139, 142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (pro se litigant “waived any challenge” to the district court’s adverse ruling because brief mentioned ruling only “obliquely and in passing”).

Here, other than mentioning “Title VII” twice in his brief, Lee fails to argue that the district court erred in dismissing his Title VII claims, and he addresses discrimination and retaliation based only on physical disability, which is not covered by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). He waived his Rehabilitation Act hostile work environment claim by failing to mention it at all in his brief. And while he reiterates his grievances that he was denied reasonable accommodations and retaliated against under the Rehabilitation Act, he provides no argument showing how the district court erred in dismissing his reasonable accommodations claim or in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim. Nor does he specify the portions of the extensive record upon which he seeks to rely. See Terry, 826 F.3d at 632–33; Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). Consequently, he has waived these claims as well. See Gerstenbluth, 728 F.3d at 142 n.4.

We have reviewed the remainder of Lee’s arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.