UNITED STATES v. Paul William Muzyka, William Reidell, Defendants. (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant George J. Connelly, Jr. (“Connelly”) was found guilty, after a jury trial, of one count of conspiracy to transport stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of interstate transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. In addition to a prison sentence, the District Court ordered that Connelly pay $8,385 in restitution and forfeit his proceeds from the sale of stolen property, which included an interest of up to $200,000 in his family home.

Connelly raises two challenges on appeal, both of which focus on the restitution and forfeiture orders. First, he argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment during that portion of the sentencing hearing in which restitution and forfeiture were considered. Second, he argues that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to order, sua sponte, that proceedings be temporarily adjourned when it allegedly became apparent that defense counsel was unprepared to effectively advocate for Connelly.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We note that although “direct appellate review is not foreclosed” we are “generally disinclined to resolve ineffective assistance claims on direct review.” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 467-68 (2d Cir. 2004). This “baseline aversion to resolving ineffectiveness claims on direct review” results from our preference to have a District Court fully develop the record on the claim of alleged ineffective assistance before we make a ruling. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 161 (2d Cir. 1998). It is for this reason that “in most cases a motion brought under [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003). Accordingly, we decline to hear Connelly’s claim for ineffective assistance at this point, but note that he is permitted to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a future § 2255 petition.

For the same reason, we decline to consider whether the District Court abused its discretion in failing to exercise its supervisory powers to adjourn proceedings so that defense counsel could have more time to prepare. Presumably, a District Court can only abuse its discretion in exercising its supervisory powers if, in doing so, it knowingly permitted ineffective assistance of counsel to go forward. Here, however, we do not reach the question of whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel, so we do not reach the question of whether the District Court erred in any way by not halting proceedings.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Connelly on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.