SMIGELSKI v. CONNECTICUT (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Anna Smigelski (“Smigelski”) contends that summary judgment was improperly granted to Defendant-Appellee the State of Connecticut in an action alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). She asks that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on her two claims—one for gender discrimination and one for gender-plus-age discrimination—be reversed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact, such that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Myers v. Patterson, 819 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 2016). “Though we must accept as true the allegations of the party defending against the summary judgment motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in [her] favor, conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.” Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted).

We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to Connecticut. Assuming that Smigelski cleared the low threshold for stating a prima facie case of gender or gender-plus-age discrimination under Title VII “using the familiar burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973),” the burden then shifted to Connecticut to rebut Smigelski’s prima facie case. Walsh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 828 F.3d 70, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2016). Connecticut did so by presenting legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for maintaining Smigelski’s classification as a Tax Correction Examiner 1 level employee. The burden then shifted back to Smigelski to produce evidence “to show that the employer’s proffered reason was merely a pretext” for discrimination. Bentley v. AutoZoners, LLC, 935 F.3d 76, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Farias v. Int’l Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If the defendant bears its burden of production ․ the defendant will be entitled to summary judgment ․ unless the plaintiff can point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “A plaintiff may carry this burden by reference to the same evidence used to establish a prima facie case, provided that the evidence admits plausible inferences of pretext.” Bentley, 935 F.3d at 89.

Smigelski cannot carry her burden because she relies only on her conclusory testimony that, for example, supervisors favored men; on facts regarding her experience that are irrelevant because the record reflects that such experience did not affect whether an employee qualified for reclassification; and on the purported disparate treatment of two male Tax Correction Examiners. We need address only Smigelski’s argument of pretext based on the purported comparators. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that a “plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations to resist a motion for summary judgment”). Smigelski’s claim that two male comparators were unfairly promoted before her is unsupported by the record. Smigelski provided no relevant evidence that the two other employees were unqualified for the promotion. As a result, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Connecticut.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Smigelski on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.