PELCZAR v. KELLY (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

James F. Pelczar, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his complaint against Queens County Surrogate's Court Judge Peter J. Kelly primarily under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), and an order denying Pelczar's motion for relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

I. Dismissal of the Complaint

We review a sua sponte dismissal, including a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, de novo. Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009) (Rooker-Feldman); J.S. v. T'Kach, 714 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (sua sponte dismissal). As we have recently explained, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine establishes “the clear principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005)). Rooker-Feldman thus applies where the federal-court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) alleges, in district court, injuries caused by the state-court judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and reject the state-court judgment, and (4) commenced the district court proceedings after the state-court judgment was rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85).

Pelczar challenges the district court's conclusion that the third requirement was satisfied, arguing that his complaint did not invite the district court to review and reject the Surrogate Court's ruling. We disagree. Pelczar sought an injunction directing the defendant, a Queens County Surrogate's Court Judge, to undo a ruling admitting a will to probate and finding that certain property was part of his father's estate. He thus asked the district court “to determine whether the state judgment was wrongfully issued.” Id. at 427.

Nevertheless, because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, Sung Cho, 910 F.3d at 644, the district court “lack[ed] the power to dismiss [the complaint] with prejudice,” Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assocs., 182 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

II. Denial of Rule 60(b) Motion

We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Gomez v. City of New York, 805 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2015). We find no abuse of discretion here. In support of his motion, Pelczar argued that a statement by a lawyer who was connected to the probate proceeding (and who was a defendant in a separate action brought by Pelczar) was evidence that the property in question was not part of his father's estate. The attorney in the other action stated in a letter to the court that “the specific issue of whether [the property was] an asset of the probate estate was never before the Surrogate's Court of Queens County[, but] the Surrogate's Court did indirectly decide that it was.” Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 7 at 7. However, that statement has no bearing on whether Pelczar invited the district court in this case to review the Surrogate's Court's judgment, thereby implicating Rooker-Feldman.^†

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We have considered all of Pelczar's arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, and AFFIRM the order.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.   We similarly conclude that the probate documents attached to Pelczar's pending motion for judicial notice have no bearing on whether the district court correctly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, we deny that motion as moot. See, e.g., United States v. Bleznak, 153 F.3d 16, 21 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1994).