IN RE: Peter J. GOULD (2020)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Peter J. Gould, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's post-judgment order denying leave to file motions seeking (1) to set aside the dismissal order, (2) reconsideration of the judgment, (3) the release of funds, (4) to remove the Trustee, and (5) a subpoena for the Trustee's records. Gould also moves, in this Court, for the production of several documents. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

I. Scope of Appeal

A notice of appeal (“NOA”) must “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.” Elliott v. City of Hartford, 823 F.3d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This requirement is jurisdictional.” Id. However, we construe pro se NOAs liberally, and we are not jurisdictionally barred from reviewing the judgment if the NOA “evinces an intent to appeal” the judgment. Id. at 172–73 (quoting Grune v. Coughlin, 913 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1990)). Additionally, an appeal from an order denying a timely reconsideration motion “suffices to bring up for review the underlying order or judgment, at least where the motion renews arguments previously made.” “R” Best Produce, Inc. v. DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2008).

Here, Gould specified that he was appealing from the order denying his motion for leave to file post-judgment motions. Nothing in the NOA could be liberally read to evince an intent to appeal the underlying judgment. We thus review only the district court's post-judgment order.

II. Denial of Post-Judgment Motion

Although we “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest,” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), pro se appellants must still comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), which “requires appellants in their briefs to provide the court with a clear statement of the issues on appeal,” Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Thus, “[a]lthough we accord filings from pro se litigants a high degree of solicitude, even a litigant representing himself is obliged to set out identifiable arguments in his principal brief.” Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631, 632–33 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Gould raises no arguments on appeal as to the district court's denial of his post-judgment motion. Instead, his brief argues that the Trustee has abused his authority and that the courts were biased against him. But Gould does not explain how the courts were biased against him, and judicial rulings alone are rarely sufficient to show bias. See Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gould's motion for leave to file several post-judgment motions. We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 150 (2d Cir. 2008) (Rule 59(e) motion); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1998) (Rule 60(b) motion). Gould's motion sought leave to file a motion to “set aside the [d]ismissal ruling” and for “reconsideration,” but Gould did not offer any basis for granting such relief. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that “reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked”). To the extent Gould also sought leave to file motions for the release of funds held by the Trustee, to remove the Trustee, and for a subpoena of the Trustee's records, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying such relief because Gould failed to make any arguments in support of those requests.

III. Motion for Production of Documents

Finally, we deny Gould's motion for the production of documents, as he has offered no arguments establishing his entitlement to such production. In any event, “we have sufficient information to decide th[is] appeal[ ] based on the materials in the record.” EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 695 F.3d 201, 204 n.4 (2d Cir. 2012).

We have considered all of Gould's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court and DENY Gould's motion for production of documents.