HENDERSON v. SAUL (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Delores Henderson appeals from a judgment of the district court entered December 20, 2018, upholding a decision of defendant-appellee Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying her claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. By decision and order entered December 19, 2018, the district court denied Henderson's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Henderson argues that the finding of the administrative law judge (the “ALJ”) that she could return to her past relevant work was not supported by substantial evidence. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“On an appeal from the denial of disability benefits, we focus on the administrative ruling rather than the district court's opinion.” Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the administrative record, we determine if there is “substantial evidence ․ to support the Commissioner's decision and if the correct legal standards have been applied.” Id. Substantial evidence is defined as “evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Indeed, “once an [administrative law judge] finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

We affirm the judgment below, as we agree that the Commissioner's ruling is supported by substantial evidence. First, Henderson argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated medical opinions, resulting in a finding that lacked substantial support, namely that her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) allowed for light work. In finding Henderson's RFC, however, the ALJ considered the medical opinions of her consultative examiner and her treating orthopedist. Henderson's consultative examiner found that she had mild to moderate limitations for prolonged walking, bending, and kneeling. Henderson's treating orthopedist found that she could perform light-duty work with no bending or stooping. Though a third physician later found that Henderson was very limited in her ability to, inter alia, sit, stand and walk, the ALJ ultimately assigned greater weight to the opinion of her treating orthopedist because of his specialized training, history with Henderson, and the fact that his assessment was consistent with Henderson's self-reported ability to engage in activities of daily living. Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.

Second, Henderson argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her credibility. “[A]n ALJ's credibility determination is generally entitled to deference on appeal.” Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 420 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Here, the ALJ considered Henderson's entire medical record and her testimony concerning the symptoms of her impairments and resulting limitations, as well as her admitted activities of daily living, and concluded that her statements were “not entirely consistent with the objective medical evidence.” App'x at 20. The ALJ's credibility determinations were supported by substantial evidence.

Finally, Henderson argues that the Appeals Council and the district court improperly rejected new and material evidence. “A court may order the Commissioner to consider additional evidence only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material․” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 506 (2d Cir. 1998). “New evidence is material if it is both (1) relevant to the claimant's condition during the time period for which the benefits were denied and (2) probative.” Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The evidence at issue includes reports of knee surgeries performed in February 2016 and September 2016, exam notes from a follow-up appointment after the second surgery, and a report from an internal medicine examination performed on December 5, 2016. This evidence postdates the ALJ's determination by at least six months and sheds insufficient light on the severity of Henderson's condition during the relevant period to conclude that it is material, as required to justify a remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Pollard, 377 F.3d at 193 (“[M]ateriality requires ․ a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have influenced the Commissioner to decide claimant's application differently.”) (alteration omitted). Accordingly, the evidence was not relevant or material.

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We have considered the remainder of Henderson's arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.